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Motivated in part by online marketplaces such as ridesharing and freelancing platforms, we study two-sided
matching markets where agents are heterogeneous in their compatibility with different types of jobs: flexible
agents can fulfill any job, whereas each specialized agent can only be matched to a specific subset of jobs.
When the set of jobs compatible with each agent is known, the full-information first-best throughput (i.e.
number of matches) can be achieved by prioritizing dispatch of specialized agents as much as possible.
When agents are strategic, however, we show that such aggressive reservation of flexible capacity incentivizes
flexible agents to pretend to be specialized. The resulting equilibrium throughput could be even lower than
the outcome under a baseline policy, which does not reserve flexible capacity, and simply dispatches jobs to
agents at random.
To balance matching efficiency with agentsâĂŹ strategic considerations, we introduce a novel robust
capacity reservation policy (RCR). The RCR policy retains a similar structure to the first best policy,
but offers additional and seemingly incompatible edges along which jobs can be dispatched. We show a
Braess’ paradox-like result, that offering these additional edges could sometimes lead to worse equilibrium
outcomes. Nevertheless, we prove that under any market conditions, and regardless of agentsâĂŹ strategies,
the proposed RCR policy always achieves higher throughput than the baseline policy. Our work highlights
the importance of considering the interplay between strategic behavior and capacity allocation policies in
service systems.
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1. Introduction
Matching markets play critical roles in business and society, facilitating the coordination of jobs and
resources. Pricing and capacity allocation policies are widely used to determine the allocation. A key
challenge that emerges in designing these policies is that they must account for the heterogeneous
preferences of strategic agents while maintaining operational efficiency. Moreover, there often exist
practical operational limitations that the policies must respect.
In a typical matching market, agents need to be matched with jobs or resources with which they
are compatible. Different agents can be heterogeneous in their flexibility: the more flexible agents
may be compatible with most resources or jobs, while many others can be more specialized and can
only be matched with a reduced subset. In these contexts, the strategic behavior of agents could lead
to challenges in improving matching efficiency. The pioneering work of Naor (1969) show that, if left
to its own devices, the strategic behavior of agents can lead classic systems studied in operations
management to inefficient outcomes.
Even though the use of monetary incentives can often times alleviate these strategic concerns,
in many important practical settings such as kidney exchange (cf., Su and Zenios 2006), school
choice (cf., Ashlagi and Shi 2016 and Shi 2019), and many online marketplaces, the use of monetary
incentives is prohibited, or restricted, by regulation or business constraints.
In this paper, we study two-sided matching markets, where agents are heterogeneous in their
flexibility. Our goal is to understand how matching policies impact the behavior of strategic agents,
and to design policies that improve overall system performance without using monetary incentives.
Motivating Application from Ridesharing. An important application is the case of rideshar-
ing platforms such as Uber and Lyft. Many of these platforms offer drivers the option to specify a
subset of destinations toward which they are willing to take trips. Figure 1 illustrates how a driver
specifies a desired destination using Uber’s “driver destinations” feature, opting out of trips heading
the opposite directions.1 For drivers who need to head home or towards social or vocational obli-
gations, this feature allows them to continue to earn on the platform instead of going offline. This
provides substantial benefits for both sides: drivers earn more, and a larger driver pool implies shorter
pick-up times and better reliability for riders.
If the platform knew exactly drivers’ flexibility over trip destinations, conventional wisdom would
implement a matching policy that reserves flexible drivers as much as possible. In other words, a
trip toward a specific destination would first be dispatched to a driver who could only serve that
destination. If there is no such driver, the trip would then be dispatched to more flexible drivers who
can serve more destinations. Such aggressive reservation of flexible capacity, however, may incentivize
1 https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/basics/driver-destinations/, visited April 26, 2020.
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(a) A driver turns online (b) A driver sets her desired destination
Figure 1 Uber’s driver destinations feature. Figure 1a is what the driver sees when she is online in downtown
Seattle; Figure 1b shows that the driver is using the destination product to accept trips toward Shoreline,
a residential area in the north of Seattle.
flexible drivers to pretend to be specialized, if specialized drivers towards certain destinations wait a
shorter time to receive a request. Such strategic behavior results in a “loss of flexibility”, and could
degrade overall system performance relative to not reserving capacity.
Model. In this paper, we study a queueing theoretic model, where jobs (e.g., trips in the context
of ridesharing) and agents (e.g., drivers) arrive over time according to independent Poisson processes.
Each job is associated with one of a finite number of types (e.g., trip destinations), and there are
broadly two sets of agents, flexible and specialized. A flexible agent can fulfill any job, whereas
each specialized agent can serve only one type of job (e.g. trips heading to a driverâĂŹs preferred
destination). The set of jobs an agent is able to fulfill represents her type, and is the agent’s private
information.
Jobs leave the platform if they are not matched upon arrival, while agents have exponentially
distributed patience levels, and abandon the system if they have not been matched when their
patience exhausts. Agents are free to decline jobs without penalty, as they too are customers of
the two-sided matching platform. We study the impact of non-monetary matching policies on the
system’s throughput, i.e., the number of matches per unit of time.
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Contributions. We now summarize our key contributions.
• We first show that when agents’ types are known, the full-information first-best policy for
throughput is achieved by prioritizing specialized agents whenever possible, as flexible agents are
more “valuable” for future matches. We call this the aggressive capacity reservation policy.
• When agents are strategic, we show that such aggressive capacity reservation may lead to longer
waiting time for a match for flexible agents relative to that of certain specialized agents. This incen-
tivizes flexible agents to under-report the set of jobs they are able to fulfill, and this loss of flexibility
may lower the system throughput. We characterize sufficient market conditions under which the
aggressive capacity reservation policy achieves even worse throughput than that of a simple baseline
policy, which does not reserve capacity, and simply dispatches jobs to agents at random. We call this
the no capacity reservation policy.
• To balance matching efficiency with agentsâĂŹ strategic considerations, we propose a novel
robust capacity reservation policy. The policy offers the drivers a flexible queue, which has highest
priority for jobs that cannot be fulfilled by any specialized agent, and for each job type a specialized
queue that is prioritized first for jobs of the corresponding type. When a job cannot be matched to
the queue with the highest priority, the policy dispatches agents from the other queues. This allows
seemingly incompatible dispatches, for example, dispatching agents in a specialized queue for jobs
that require flexible agents, since some flexible agents may decide to join the specialized queues.
Intuitively, the robust capacity reservation policy retains similar structure to the first best policy
(i.e. prioritizing specialized queues for jobs that can be completed by specialized agents), but offers
additional incompatible edges along which jobs can be dispatched.
We prove that for any market conditions, and regardless of the strategy profile taken by the
agents, the robust capacity reservation policy always achieves (weakly) higher throughput than the no
capacity reservation baseline. This robust performance might, at a first glance, appear to be the result
of the addition of the seemingly incompatible dispatches. In a Braess’ paradox-like result, however,
we show that allowing these additional edges can sometimes lead to worse equilibrium outcomes by
reducing the waiting times of the specialized queues, thereby incentivizing more flexible agents to
join. Thus, the best throughput can be achieved by selecting between robust capacity reservation
and aggressive capacity reservation policies based on market conditions. Nevertheless, we show via
simulations that under practical market conditions, the robust capacity reservation policy is often
better. We illustrate how this policy can be easily implemented in the driver destination product of
major ridesharing platforms.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we discuss related work. In Section 3, we introduce
the main model elements and analyze the full-information and non-strategic setting. In Section 4,
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we consider strategic agents and study the performance of aggressive capacity reservation in this
setting. In Section 5, we propose and analyze the robust capacity reservation policy. We conclude in
Section 6.
2. Related Literature
In this section, we briefly review related works that study service systems with strategic agents from
the queueing game and mechanism design literature.
Queues with transfers. In his pioneering work, Naor (1969) shows that in classical service
systems studied in operations management, the strategic behavior of agents can lead to inefficient
system outcomes. He argues that to address such inefficiencies, the system provider can rely on
monetary transfers. Other work in the literature that have studied the role of monetary transfers
in contexts related to ours come from the literature of strategic queues with priority. There are two
perspectives about this type of queues. First, there are works that analyze priority schemes within
queues, see e.g., Kleinrock (1967), Dolan (1978), Hassin (1995), Afe`che and Mendelson (2004) and
Yang et al. (2017). Essentially, in this line of research, customers pay an amount or participate in
an auction that determines their position (priority) in the queue. The second perspective, which is
more aligned with our work, corresponds to priorities between classes of customers (see e.g., Cobham
(1954)). In this type of model there is a single server who serves customers with higher priority first
(preemptive or non-preemptive regimes can be accommodated), and then continue with customers of
lower priorities. In many settings the priority classes can be purchased by the customers; see e.g., Rao
and Petersen (1998). The underlying paradigm in these studies is that by using monetary transfers
the service provider can appropriately manage a system with strategic interactions among agents.
In the present work, motivated by practical considerations, however, we do not allow for monetary
transfers and, as consequence, attaining the most efficient outcome might no longer be possible.
Queues without transfers. Our work relates to a broad class of problems studied in queuing
systems in which strategic agents have diverse options when joining a system, and the system provider
is constrained to use matching or scheduling policies to optimize the system performance. One of
the main challenges in managing these systems is that matching policies alone are, typically, not
enough to incentivize agents to make system-wide optimal choices. Parlaktu¨rk and Kumar (2004),
for example, consider a system with two queues in which strategic agents choose to start their service
in one of the queues (and then continue on the other) to minimize their sojourn time. Their focus is
on the design of state-dependent scheduling rules of server resources that have a performance close
to the first best. In the context of call centers, Armony and Maglaras (2004) study a model in which
heterogeneous, time-sensitive costumers strategically choose between two modes of service (online or
call back option). The system’s manager designs how to allocate servers between the two modes to
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maximize quality of service subject to certain operational constraints; see Hassin (2009) for a related
framework with two queues. The key features that make our study distinct from these previous works
are that in our setting the number of queues is a design choice, not all servers are equal and there
is an underlying compatibility graph. In the context of kidney transplants, Su and Zenios (2006)
propose a market design that is similar to ours. However, their system admits a decomposition of
the queues because the matching polices they analyze are not state-dependent. In our case, such
decomposition is not possible because our state-dependent policies couple the queues. Veeraraghavan
and Debo (2009) study how agents’ queue joining decisions are shaped by information externality of
queue length and service quality. Cui and Veeraraghavan (2016) investigate the case where customers
join the queue without full knowledge of the service rate. We assume agents cannot directly observe
queue lengths but are aware of the exact parameters of the system and focus on how matching
policies can impact expected waiting time which determines queue choices. Gopalakrishnan et al.
(2016) investigate routing and staffing decision under a setting where servers can strategically adjust
their service rates to balance values of efforts and idleness. In our setting, service rates are directly
controlled by the platform’s matching policy.
Non-monetary mechanism design. There is also an important stream of work steming from
scheduling and algorithmic mechanism design that considers systems with strategic agents and no
monetary transfers. In the prototypical setting, strategic agents decide in which shared resource or
machine to complete a task to minimize the finishing time (see e.g., Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
(1999)). The common theme of these works is to analyze the resulting equilibrium and, some times,
the price of anarchy that emerges in various settings. For examples, Christodoulou et al. (2004)
consider the case of coordination mechanisms, Ashlagi et al. (2010) study a setting with competing
schedulers, Ashlagi et al. (2013) consider a related problem in a queueing setting, and Koutsoupias
(2014) studies a setting in which machines can lie about the time it takes them to complete a task.
A main difference of our work with the aforementioned papers is that, in our setting, tasks have
different types which makes them compatible only with a subset of machines. There are other works,
however, that do incorporate a compatibility graph among agents and jobs. For example, Dughmi and
Ghosh (2010) consider a version of the generalized assignment problem in which agents can misreport
their compatibility with tasks (or, more generally, their value for tasks) for a given matching design.
Motivated by kidney exchange programs, Ashlagi et al. (2015) consider the problem of designing a
matching mechanism that makes it incentive compatible for the hospital to reveal their compatibility
graphs. Similar to these papers, we consider the design of matching policies without payments. A
difference is that our matching policies critically depend on the dynamically evolving state of the
system.
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3. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce our model and characterize the optimal matching policy in the full
information setting, where agent types are observed by the platform. Later, in Section 4, we extend
the model to the private information setting.
3.1. Model
We study a matching platform where jobs and agents arrive randomly over time. There are broadly
two sets of agents, flexible agents and specialized agents, and a set of `+ 1 types of jobs, denoted as
L= {0, · · · , `}. A specialized agent of type i∈ {1, · · · , `} can only fulfill jobs of type i, while flexible
agents (indexed by 0) are able to complete any job (including the type 0 jobs, which model all jobs
that cannot be served by any specialized agent).
Let A(t) = (A(t)0 ,A
(t)
1 , . . . ,A
(t)
` ) denote the number of agents of each type on the platform at time
t≥ 0, where A(t)i is the number of type i agents at time t. We sometimes drop the time index t to
represent static values. Figure 2 below depicts the compatibility graph.
Flexible Agents
Jobs
type 0
type 1
type `
......
type `
type 0
type 1
Specialized Agents
Figure 2 The compatibility between agents and jobs.
Jobs and agents arrive according to Poisson processes, respectively, with rates λ= (λ0, λ1, . . . , λ`)
and µ = (µ0, µ1, . . . , µ`). The Poisson arrival rate of type i agent is denoted by λi > 0, and that of
type j job is denoted by µj > 0. We assume that a job leaves the platform (i.e. becomes unfulfilled)
if it is not matched upon arrival, while agents have exponentially distributed patience level and
would abandon the platform at rate θ > 0. The average time an agent spends on the platform before
departing is therefore 1/θ.
A policy determines how the platform dispatches incoming jobs to agents on the platform. We
consider a space of policies Φ, where each policy φ∈Φ is a mapping from the current state (i.e. the
number of agents of each type) and the type of the arriving job to a distribution over (compatible)
agent types.2 In other words, a job that arrives is assigned to an agent type depending on the state
2 To ease the presentation, we defer formal definition of the state space and feasible policies to Appendix A.1; see
Equation (3).
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of the system and the job type. Once a particular type is selected, the policy then dispatches the job
to an arbitrary agent with that type.
Our goal is to investigate how various policies affect the system’s performance in terms of through-
put, i.e., the long-run number of matches. Let Mφ(T ) denote the total number of matches made
under policy φ, up to time T > 0 and E[Mφ(T )|A(0) = A] is the expected numer of matches up to
time T given the initial number of agents on the platform is A∈Z`+1≥0 . The expectation is taken over
all the randomness in the system, i.e., the arrival of agents and jobs, agents’ abandonment, and the
policy φ. The long-run throughput under a policy φ, TP(φ), is of the form:
TP(φ) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E[Mφ(T )|A(0) =A]. (1)
Note that this long-run average is invariant to the initial condition A(0).
We now introduce a baseline policy that will serve as one of our benchmarks throughout the paper.
No capacity reservation. The No Capacity Reservation (NCR) policy dispatches each job ran-
domly to all compatible agents. Under the NCR policy, a type j 6= 0 job will be matched to a type 0
agent with probability A0/(A0 +Aj), and to a type j agent with probability Aj/(A0 +Aj); a type 0
job will be matched to a type 0 agent with probability 1. The NCR policy represents the “status-quo”
when there is minimal platform intervention (no deliberate prioritization of agents or reservation of
capacity).
3.2. Observable Agent Types: Aggressive Capacity Reservation is Optimal
In comparison to specialized agents, flexible agents are more valuable for the platform because they
can fulfill all types of jobs. Hence, it is natural to consider the following policy which reserves flexible
agents as much as possible.
Aggressive capacity reservation. The Aggressive Capacity Reservation (ACR) policy dispatches
a job of type j 6= 0 to a type j agent if there is any available type j agent on the platform. Otherwise,
the job will be dispatched to a type 0 agent. Type 0 jobs are always dispatched to type 0 agents.
The following result shows that when agents’ types are known to the platform, the ACR policy
achieves the full information first best (FB) throughput, i.e., the highest possible long run number
of matches achievable among policies in Φ, the set of state-dependent policies.
Proposition 1 (First Best). The ACR policy achieves the highest throughput among all poli-
cies in Φ.
To formally prove the optimality of the ACR policy, we build on the following result, which states
that under ACR, having an additional flexible agent always results in (weakly) higher expected
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throughput than having one extra specialized agent of any type, all else being equal. Let ei ∈ Z`+1≥0
be the vector which is zero except for the ith element.
Lemma 1 (Value of a Flexible Agent under ACR). Under the ACR policy φACR, for any
time horizon T ≥ 0, given any A∈Z`+1≥0 ,
E[MφACR(T ) |A(0) =A+ e0]≥E[MφACR(T ) |A(0) =A+ ei], ∀i∈L. (2)
The proof of this lemma builds on a sample path argument, where fixing any horizon T and
any arrival sequence of jobs and agents up to time T , we prove that an additional flexible agent is
more valuable than a additional specialized agent. Starting from the last event of such sequence, we
inductively show that the result holds from the time of this event till time T . In turn, we establish
the result holds for any arbitrary arrival sequence of agents and jobs, which is stronger than what is
stated. Note that in the proof, the expectation is taken only over the number of agents that abandon
the system. In fact, the difficulty of the proof is to find a proper way of analyzing reneging. The
result is not true if we fix reneging in the sample path. For example, in the system that starts with
A+ e0, the additional flexible driver could potentially renege well before being matched which will,
in turn, give an advantage to the system that starts with A+ ei.
To see why Lemma 1 implies Proposition 1, consider any candidate state-dependent policy, and
let us compare it with the ACR policy. Suppose that both policies start from the same initial state
and are run under the same arrival sequence of jobs and agents. Let t be the first time that the
two policies make a different match, then at time t the candidate policy matched a type j 6= 0 job
with a flexible agent, while the ACR policy matched that job with a specialized type j agent. From
this point onward, the two policies run from different states — the candidate policy continues from
A(t)−e0 while the ACR policy continues from A(t)−ej . We can compare the two policies by artificially
modifying the state that ACR policy continues from to be A(t) − e0 (in stead of A(t) − ej), so that
the two policies now continue from the same state again. By Lemma 1, the ACR policy starting
from A(t)− ej is weakly better than that starting from A(t)− e0. The optimality of ACR will then be
established by repeating this argument.
We conclude this section by noting that Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 are reminiscent of results
in parallel contexts which highlight the value of preserving flexible resources to improve operational
efficiency. Such examples include Jordan and Graves (1995) in manufacturing process and supply
chain flexibility; Tsitsiklis and Xu (2013, 2017) in resource pooling of multi-server queues; and Hu
and Zhou (2018) and O¨zkan and Ward (2020) in optimal policies of dynamic matching problems.
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4. Strategic Agents
In the previous section, we made the assumption that the platform can observe agents’ true types. In
practice, however, such information is usually private to the agents. Consider ridesharing, for example,
where a driver can signal that she is of a specialized type by turning on the “driver destination”
feature and accept only trips towards a specific destination. Whether the driver indeed has such a
preference cannot be observed by the platform. In this section, we study dispatching policies where
agent types are private and agents are strategic.
4.1. Priority Matching Queues
A natural way to implement the matching policies for strategic agents is via priorities queues. The
agents choose queues that signals their type. Then, the platform dispatches jobs to queues based on
the job type. Each queue has different dispatching priorities over different types of jobs.
Consider, for example, the ACR policy in the context of ridesharing. The platform effectively offers
`+ 1 queues. A driver with the “driver destination” feature turned on and set to destination j 6= 0
can be considered as having joined queue j, while the rest of the drivers can be considered as having
joined queue 0. Type 0 jobs are dispatched to queue 0, while type j jobs will be dispatched to queue
j first, and will be dispatched to queue 0 if the job is not able to be matched in queue j. Intuitively,
specialized drivers with destination j > 0 gets priority for trips heading to that destination.
Note that the number of queues a platform organizes does not have to correspond to number of
types. For example, one way to implement the NCR policy is to organize a single queue, and the
platform dispatches drivers from this queue for any job. In the ridesharing example, this corresponds
to the case where the platform does not offer destination mode feature at all. We assume agents can
choose which queue to join based on waiting time to a successful match. In addition, they are also
free to reject jobs when the job is of a type she is not able or willing to serve. In our setting, since
all jobs have the same reward, agents accept any compatible jobs (and rejecting incompatible ones).
But they can strategize to reduce their waiting time by choosing the queue to which they join; see
Section 4.2.
When a job is dispatched to a queue, we assume it will be assigned uniformly at random to all
agents in that queue.3 Random allocation captures the important features of quality-driven matching
policies. Indeed, it is equivalent to the closest-match policy used by ridesharing platforms (also
known as first-dispatch protocol), which dispatches a rider request to the closest driver. Under the
assumption of spatially uniform distribution of drivers and uniform arrival of request locations, which
is common in the literature (see e.g., Castillo et al. 2017, Besbes et al. 2018 and Yan et al. 2019),
the closest-match policy would be equivalent to the random allocation (cf. Larson and Odoni 1981).
3 Even though we use a random service discipline, we believe our result hold under other common service disciplines
in service systems.
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If a job is rejected by an agent, the platform will re-dispatch it (without replacement) uniformly
at random to the remaining agents in the queue. If all agents reject, the platform will move to the
next queue as specified by the mechanism.
We now introduce some notation for formally defining the dispatching policies that we study in
the strategic setting. A dispatching policy pi , (Q, ρ) consists of a set of queues Q and a tuple
ρ= (ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρ`). Q can be of any size. For each job type j ∈L, ρj specifies an ordered list of queues
which is a permutation of any subset of Q. In other words, a type j job would be first dispatched
uniformly at random to the agents in the first queue in the ordered list ρj . If the job remains not
matched (either because the first queue is empty or because all the agents in the first queue had
rejected this job), it will be sent to an agent in the next queue uniformly at random. The job goes
unfulfilled (lost), if it remains unmatched after exhausting all queues in the ordered list.
The NCR and ACR policies can both be represented with this notation. The NCR policy piNCR ,
(QNCR, ρNCR), for example, offers a single queue (QNCR = {0}), and the ordered lists contains only queue
0 for all types of jobs, i.e., ρNCRj = (0) for all j ∈L. See Figure 3a. The ACR policy piACR , (QACR, ρACR),
as illustrated in Figure 3b, can be interpreted as offering `+ 1 queues (QACR = {0,1, · · · , `}), and the
ordered list is specified as ρACR0 = (0) and ρACRj = (j,0) for all j ∈L\{0}. We sometimes refer to queue
0 as the flexible queue, and call the queues 1 through ` the specialized queues.
4.2. Strategic Behavior of Agents
We now describe the strategic behavior of agents. Upon arrival, each agent chooses which queue to
join with the goal of minimizing the expected waiting time till a successful match. We denote the
strategy of agents of type i as σi = [0,1]|Q|, where σiq for each q ∈ Q is the probability with which
a type i agent joins queue q. σ = (σ0, σ1, . . . , σ`) denotes the strategy profile of all agent types. We
assume that upon arrival, agents do not have information about the exact queue lengths, and decide
on which queue to join based on the steady-state expected waiting times of each queue. We assume
agents do not switch queues once they join. We note that under the NCR policy there is only one
possible strategy profile — all types of agents join queue 0. In what follows it will be convenient
to denote the set of all possible strategy profiles as Σ(Q),∏i∈LΣi(Q), where Σi(Q) is the set of
probability measures over the set of queues Q.
Consider a strategy profile σ ∈Σ(Q) under some policy pi. Let W piiq(σ) be the waiting time of a type
i∈L agent given strategy profile σ, if she decided to join queue q ∈Q. E[W piiq(σ)] is the steady-state
expected waiting time where the expectation is taking over all randomness including the state of the
system when the agent joins. σ forms a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i∈L and all q ∈Q:
σiq > 0 ⇒ E[W piiq(σ)] ≤ E[W piiq′(σ)], ∀q′ ∈Q. (NE)
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Flexible Agents
θ
Jobs
µ1
µ0
µ`
......
λ`
λ0
λ1
σ00
σ10
σ`0
queue 0
Specialized Agents
(a) No capacity reservation (NCR).
Flexible Agents
θ
θ
θ
Jobs
µ1
µ0
µ`
.........
σ00
σ01
σ0`
σ11
σ``
λ1
λ`
λ0 queue 0
queue `
queue 1
Specialized Agents
(b) Aggressive capacity reservation (ACR).
Figure 3 The NCR and ACR policies, when agent types are not observed by the platform.
Intuitively, eq. (NE) requires that if type i agents join queue q with non-zero probability, the expected
waiting time from joining queue q must be the smallest among joining any queue.
The following result guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium for any policy and model
primitives such that the steady state waiting times, E[W piiq(σ)], are continuous with respect to the
strategy profile σ. Its proof consists of writing eq. (NE) as an equivalent variational inequality. We
then cast it as a fixed point equation which is guaranteed to have a solution in virtue of Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem.
Proposition 2 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium). For any matching policy pi such that the
expected waiting times E[W piiq(σ)] is continuous in agents strategies σ for all i∈L and all q ∈Q, there
exists a strategy profile σ that forms a Nash equilibrium.
4.3. Perils of Aggressive Capacity Reservation
The ACR policy no longer achieves the first-best throughput when agent types are private informa-
tion. Consider, for example, a scenario where the arrival rate of type 0 job is low. Under the ACR
policy, the flexible agents may have an incentive to pretend to be specialized in order to reduce their
waiting times. This loss of flexibility in turn leads to the loss of type 0 jobs that could have been
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fulfilled, and might result in an overall decrease of throughput. In fact, it can achieve even lower
throughput than the “status quo” NCR policy.
We now provide a sufficient condition under which the ACR policy achieves lower throughput in a
Nash equilibrium than the throughput under NCR. Let σACR be an equilibrium strategy profile under
the ACR policy. TP(pi;σ) denotes the throughput under policy pi and strategy profile σ, defined as
lim supT→∞ 1T E[M
pi(T )] where Mpi(T ) is the number of matches up to time T under policy pi. Note
that since there is only one possible strategy profile σNCR under the NCR policy (all drivers joining
the same queue), we use TP(piNCR) to denote its throughput.
Theorem 1 (ACR Can be Worse than NCR). Suppose there are two types of agents and
jobs, L= {0,1}. For any λ0 > 0, λ1 > 0, µ1 > 0 and θ > 0, there exists µ0 > 0 such that for any µ0 <µ0,
TP(piACR;σACR)< TP(piNCR), ∀σACR satisfies eq. (NE).
Intuitively, Theorem 1 means that whenever the arrival rate of jobs requiring flexible agents is small
enough, the equilibrium throughput under the ACR policy drops below the throughput achieved by
the NCR policy.
To prove the theorem, we first characterize agents’ best response strategies under the ACR policy.
We then show that for the resulting equilibrium, the NCR policy yields a larger throughput compared
to that of the ACR policy. We first observe that, under the ACR policy and any model primitives,
there is no incentive for a specialized agent of type i 6= 0 to join a queue q 6= i that does not have
priority for type i jobs. We formalize this in Lemma 3 in Appendix B.
Next, we establish the equilibrium behavior of flexible agents under the assumptions of Theorem 1.
Proposition 3. Suppose there are two types of agents and jobs, L = {0,1}. Under the ACR
policy, given any λ0 > 0, λ1 > 0, µ1 > 0 and θ > 0, there exists µ0 > 0 such that for any µ0 ≤ µ0, in
every equilibrium, all flexible agents will join the specialize queue.
Flexible agents can fulfill any job, and therefore may benefit from joining a queue with a lower
waiting time than the flexible queue. Proposition 3 makes this intuition precise by establishing that,
for any model primitives, as we decrease the arrival rate of type 0 jobs, in equilibrium, all flexible
agents will eventually choose to join the specialize queue (see Figure 4b).
Finally, to conclude the proof of the theorem, we note that under the ACR policy, when all flexible
agents choose to join queue 1, it effectively operates a single queue as NCR. However, compared
to NCR, all type 0 jobs are lost. Therefore, the throughput under the NCR policy dominates the
throughput under the ACR policy when the arrival rate of type 0 jobs is small enough.
Figure 4 illustrates the phenomena as descried in Theorem 1. As we vary µ0, the arrival rate of
jobs that cannot be fulfilled by specialized agents, Figure 4a shows the throughput of ACR and NCR
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as a fraction of the full-information first-best throughput. In Figure 4b, we report the equilibrium
probability for flexible agents to join the specialized queue under the ACR policy.
When µ0 is small, the throughput under the NCR policy is close to the first best, since despite
matching some type 1 jobs with flexible agents, a small arrival rate of type 0 jobs means that it’s
less likely that there will be no available flexible agents to fulfill them upon arrival. The NCR policy
also achieves close to first best throughput when µ0 is sufficiently large, but for a different reason.
With a very large µ0, the number of flexible agents in the queue will be sufficiently small, so that
the probability for a type 1 job to be matched with a flexible agent will be very small anyway.
Therefore, the lowest throughput under the NCR policy (relative to the first best) happens when µ0
is moderately large.
For the ACR policy, as is proved in Proposition 3, a smaller arrival rate of type 0 jobs incentivizes
more flexible agents to join the specialized queue. This loss of flexibility results in more unfulfilled
type 0 jobs, and worse performance relative to the first best and the NCR policy. However, as µ0
approaches to 0, the throughput under ACR also converges to the first best, since the total throughput
loss due to unfilfilled type 0 jobs is bounded by µ0.
10 20 30 40 50 60
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
µ0
ACR
NCR
(a) Throughput (as a fraction of FB)
10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
µ0
ACR
(b) Equilibrium Prob. of joining queue 1
Figure 4 ACR versus NCR. Throughput of the ACR and NCR policies (relative to FB), and the equilibrium
probability for flexible agents to join the specialized queue under ACR. λ0 = 40, λ1 = 60, µ1 = 40 and
θ= 4.
5. The Robust Capacity Reservation Policy
The possibility for the ACR policy to achieve even worse throughput than the status quo NCR policy
is intriguing but also unsatisfactory — in ridesharing, for example, this means that the platform may
sometimes be better off by ignoring the destination preferences drivers set when making dispatch
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decisions. In this section, we introduce the robust capacity reservation (RCR) policy, which has a
more versatile matching process in comparison to the ACR policy. We prove that the RCR policy
achieves a robust throughput improvement over the NCR policy.
Robust capacity reservation. A Robust Capacity Reservation policy (RCR) offers to agents
`+ 1 queues: QRCR = {0,1, · · · , `}. An arriving job of type j ∈L is dispatched according to an ordered
list ρRCRj , where ρRCRj is a permutation of QRCR where the first priority is queue j.
An RCR policy prioritizes queue j for type j jobs, but if there is no successful match after exhaust-
ing all agents in queue j, the job will be dispatched to agents in the other queues following the order
prescribed by ρRCRj .4 For example, with two types of agents and jobs L = {0,1}, the ACR policy is
specified by QRCR = {0,1}, ρRCR0 = (0,1), and ρRCR1 = (1,0). In comparison to the ACR policy, the novelty
of the RCR policy is to add a seemingly incompatible edge from type 0 jobs to the specialized queue
(see Figure 5). Note that if agents are not strategic and each join their corresponding queues, this
step in the RCR policy would not add any value. However, when the flexible agents are strategic,
this allows type 0 jobs to be dispatched to the specialized queue when the flexible queue is empty,
hence some of such jobs that would have been lost would be completed by the flexible agents who
had joined the specialized queue. With more than two types of agents and jobs, the RCR policy also
includes additional “incompatible” edges from each type j 6= 0 job to other specialized queues q 6= j.
Flexible Agents
Specialized Agents
σ00
σ01
σ11
λ1
λ0
θ
θ
Jobs
µ1
µ0queue 0
queue 1
Figure 5 A two-type example of robust capacity reservation. The RCR policy adds a seemingly incompatible edge
(in blue) from type 0 jobs to the specialized queue 1.
5.1. A Braess’ Paradox
At a first glance, in comparison to the ACR policy, an RCR policy makes better use of flexible agents
— jobs that cannot be fulfilled by the corresponding specialized queue or the flexible queue will be
dispatched to the rest of the specialized queues, and can potentially be fulfilled by flexible agents
therein. This, however, does not guarantee an improved throughput, since the resulting higher service
4 Note that this definition allows for a family of policies — the ordering of the rest of the queues in ρRCRj following
queue j can be any arbitrary permutation of QRCR \ {j}. Our results hold for any RCR policy in this family, and do
not depend on the specific choice of this ordering.
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rate for the specialized queues may incentivize more flexible agents to join the specialized queues.
The following result formalizes this observation.
Proposition 4. Suppose there are two types of agents and jobs, L= {0,1}. For any model prim-
itives, there exists equilibrium strategies σRCR and σACR such that the fraction of flexible agents joining
queue 1 in equilibrium is weakly higher under the RCR policy than that under the ACR policy, i.e.,
σRCR01 ≥ σACR01 .
Proposition 4 relates to Braess’ paradox (see e.g., Braess (1968)): the addition of a seemingly
beneficial edge may lead to worse outcome in equilibrium. In our setting, this proposition shows that
more flexible agents may choose to join queue 1, and as a consequence, the platform may end up
using flexible agents in an inefficient manner by matching more type 1 jobs to flexible agents.
In Figure 6, we provide an instance of Braess’ paradox, comparing the throughput of the two
policies as the arrival rate of the flexible agents λ0 varies. When λ0 is small, all flexible agents choose
to join queue 1 under the RCR policy (see Figure 6b). This seemingly counter-intuitive outcome
arises because when λ0 is small, under RCR, the flexible queue is often empty and jobs arrive to
queue 1 with a rate close to µ0 + µ1. A flexible agent therefore waits less being in queue 1, because
she now gets higher priority for type 1 jobs while still getting dispatched the type 0 jobs.
Under the ACR policy, however, as long as the arrival rate of type 0 jobs µ0 is high enough, it is to
the best interest of flexible agents to stay in the flexible queue because they no longer get type 0 job
dispatches once they switched to the specialized queue. In turn, in equilibrium, RCR may operate
exactly as NCR, while ACR may achieve first best. We refer the readers to Bell and Stidham Jr (1983)
and Cohen and Kelly (1990) for similar examples of Braess’ paradox in a stochastic queuing network
and in a multi-server queueing system, respectively. Despite this limitation of the RCR policy, we will
see in the next section that this policy is appealing in practice as it showcases a robust performance
improvement over NCR.
5.2. Performance Guarantees for Robust Capacity Reservation
We now prove the main result of this paper, that regardless of the market conditions and (flexible)
agent strategic behaviors, the RCR policy always achieves weakly higher throughput than the NCR
policy employed by many platforms.
Theorem 2 (Robust Improvement over NCR). For any strategy profile σ ∈ Σ(QRCR) such
that σii = 1,∀i ∈ L \ {0}, the throughput achieved by the RCR policy is always higher than or equal
to that under the NCR policy:
TP(piRCR;σ)≥ TP(piNCR).
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Figure 6 A Braess’ paradox (RCR versus ACR). Figure 6a depicts throughput as a fraction of the first best
throughput for ACR and RCR. Figure 6b shows the fraction of flexible agents that join queue 1 in
equilibrium. The model primitives are λ1 = 60, µ0 = 30, µ1 = 40 and θ= 4.
Similar to the ACR policy, it is a dominant strategy for all specialized agents to join their cor-
responding specialized queues under the RCR policy. Theorem 2 thereby establishes that the RCR
policy outperforms the NCR policy given any strategy profile σ0 adopted by the flexible agents, in
equilibrium or not.
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on a key fact that fixing the number of agents of each type on
the platform, for any type j 6= 0 job, its probability of being matched to a type 0 (flexible) agent
under RCR is always (weakly) lower than that under the NCR policy. Note that this always holds
regardless of how many flexible agents had joined each queue under RCR. To see this, suppose that
at time t, the number of agents of each type on the platform is A(t) = (A(t)0 ,A
(t)
1 , . . . ,A
(t)
` ). The NCR
policy matches the type j job to a flexible agent with probability A(t)0 /(A
(t)
0 +A
(t)
j ), whereas the RCR
policy randomizes among A(t)j type j agents and those flexible agents who decided to join queue j,
which is upper bounded by A(t)0 . This reveals that RCR is better than NCR in terms of preserving
flexible agents. The proof, presented in Appendix C, then builds on similar ideas to our “value of
flexibility” result, Lemma 1, and deals with the difficulty of evaluating reneging since a system with
more remaining flexible agents is prone to a higher chance of losing flexible agents.
Under two types of agents and jobs, the RCR policy becomes exactly the same as the NCR policy
when all flexible agents switch to queue 1. As the switching fraction decreases, RCR improves over
NCR. When there are more than two types, one can show that there is a strict separation between
RCR and NCR, i.e., RCR is strictly better than NCR because, regardless of flexible agents’ strategies,
the two policies can never become the same.
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For the exact same setting as in Figure 4, Figure 7a demonstrates the robust performance of the
RCR policy, as the arrival rate of type 0 jobs µ0 varies. When λ0 is small (regions (i) and (ii)), the
RCR policy achieves higher throughput than both ACR and RCR— the ACR policy loses flexibility
when a large fraction of flexible agents join queue 1, while the NCR policy makes inefficient use of
the flexible agents and leaves type 0 jobs unfulfilled. As λ0 increases, flexible agents are more likely
to stay in the flexible queue. The ACR policy briefly and slightly outperforms the RCR policy (the
Braess’ Paradox; region (iii)), before both converge to the first best (region (iv)). Figure 7b shows
the equilibrium fraction of flexible agents joining queue 1 under the RCR policy is always weakly
higher than that under the ACR policy, as characterized in Proposition 4.
(i) (ii)(iii) (iv)
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Figure 7 Robust improvement. Figure 7a depicts throughput as a fraction of the first best throughput for ACR,
NCR and RCR. Figure 7b shows the fraction of flexible agents that join queue 1 in equilibrium for ACR
and RCR. The model primitives are λ0 = 40, λ1 = 60, µ1 = 40 and θ= 4.
5.3. Discussion
One of the main goals of the present work is to design a simple and practical policy that can deliver
robust performance improvement over the status quo policy, the no capacity reservation policy, where
the platform does not offer a feature for agents to express preferences over jobs and the different
levels of agent flexibility are simply ignored. In the ridesharing example, this is a baseline policy
where the platform always assigns a rider to her nearest driver regardless of the driver has destination
preference or not. To this end, the robust capacity reservation policy achieves this goal while still
allowing the platform offer flexibility to agents.
From a practical point of view, the simplicity of the RCR policy makes it a good candidate for
implementation. Consider our ridesharing example. Figure 8 depicts how RCR can be implemented
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in the actual driver destination product. Figure 8a shows the dispatch screen when a driver who opts
in destination mode receives a job towards her chosen destination, which represents a dispatch of
job type j 6= 0 to queue j in the model. Figure 8b shows the dispatch screen when the same driver
is being dispatched a job which is away from her chosen destination, this represents a dispatch of
job type 0 to queue j 6= 0. In both cases, the driver is free to accept (by clicking the “tap to accept”
button in the figure) or reject (by clicking the “no thanks” button in the figure) the dispatch based
on her underlying true preferences. For the case in Figure 8b, a (true) specialized driver will reject
the dispatch whereas a (pretended) specialized but flexible driver will accept the dispatch. According
to RCR, such away-from-destination dispatches will only occur when the platform runs out of flexible
drivers.
(a) A driver with destination mode receives
a ride toward her destination
(b) A driver with destination mode receives
a ride away from her destination
Figure 8 An implementation example of robust capacity reservation (RCR) in the Driver Destination feature on
the Uber app.
Unfortunately, we are unable to discuss ongoing product development in further details. But we
hope the above discussion would highlight the practicality of our purposed policy, complementing
our theoretical results in the previous sections.
6. Conclusion
The success of Uber and other gig economy platforms points to the tremendous value placed by
labor market participants on flexibility and on having work-like experiences that give them the
Castro et al.: Matching Queues, Flexibility and Incentives
20
ability to independently balance their work schedule and personal lives. At the same time, in many
industries, paradigms for achieving operational efficiency rely on a central planner being able to freely
allocate workers. Indeed, the benefits of operational efficiency sometimes prevented the infiltration
of gig economy business models into other industries. This paper centers around the broad topic of
balancing operational efficiency with flexibility, with a focus on controlling online matching platforms
with heterogeneous agents.
To be more specific, we have proposed a model of matching queues with strategic and heteroge-
neous agents. Our model is motivated by an example in ridesharing platforms like Uber in which
drivers customize the subset of destinations toward which they are willing to take trips. We study
dispatching policies which assign jobs to agents and consider whether reserving (flexible) capacity is
beneficial, especially when agents are strategic and agent type is private information. We show that
although a policy which reserves flexible agents as much as possible achieves optimal throughput in
the full information setting, it can backfire and lead to worse performance in the private information
setting as it creates an incentive for agents to under-report the set of jobs they can serve. Under
certain market conditions, it can be even worse than the throughput under a policy which does not
reserve flexible capacity and distinguish different levels of agent flexibility. We then describe a sim-
ple, easy-to-implement, yet robust capacity reservation policy which always delivers higher or equal
throughput over the no capacity reservation policy, under any model primitives and assumptions
about agentsâĂŹ strategic behaviors. We show under practical conditions, it can produce significantly
higher throughput and discuss an example of real-world implementation.
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Appendix. Proofs for Matching Queues, Flexibility and Incentives
A. Definitions and Proofs in Section 3
A.1. Definition of a Policy
Here we formally define the set of dispatching policies we consider under the full information setting. The
policy acts each time a job arrives. Let j ∈L be an arbitrary type of arriving job. Let (A, j) indicate the state
at the time when this job arrives where A= (A0,A1, · · · ,A`)∈Z`+1≥0 contains the number of waiting agents of
each type. An assignment policy is a function φ :Z`+1≥0 ×L→ [0,1]`+2, where φi(A, j) denotes the probability
of assigning a type j job to a type i agent, when the number of agents of different types is A. In addition,
φ−1(A, j) is the probability of unfulfilling the job, which means that the incoming job request is rejected
either intentionally or because there is no available compatible agent. This allows us to consider idling policies
as well where the platform can choose to reject jobs even if there are compatible agents available. The set of
admissible policy Φ is defined as:
Φ,
φ :
φ :Z`+1≥0 ×L 7→ [0,1]`+2,∑
i∈{−1,0,··· ,`} φi(A, j) = 1, ∀j, ∀A
φi(A, j) = 0, ∀j, ∀i, ∀A :Ai = 0
φi(A, j) = 0, ∀j, ∀i 6= 0, j
 (3)
The second row of eq. (3) restricts the admissible policy to be a probability measure over all actions —
there are L+ 2 actions in total including L+ 1 types of agents to be assigned and option −1 representing
rejection of the job; the third row prevents assigning jobs to an agent type without available agents; the last
row ensures that jobs are only assigned to compatible agents.
We now formally define the ACR and NCR policies under the full information setting in Section 3 using
this notation. Please note that there are different definitions in Section 4 when agents are strategic.
• The ACR policy, φACR ∈Φ is such that:
φACRj (A, j) = 1, if Aj > 0,∀j ∈L
φACR0 (A, j) = 1, if A0 > 0,Aj = 0,∀j ∈L
• The NCR policy, φNCR ∈Φ is such that:
φNCRj (A, j) =
Aj
Aj +A0
, if Aj +A0 > 0,∀j ∈L
φNCR0 (A, j) =
A0
Aj +A0
, if Aj +A0 > 0,∀j ∈L
A.2. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. For any time horizon T ≥ 0, we want to prove the following inequality holds:
E[MφACR(T ) |A(0) =A+ e0]≥E[MφACR(T ) |A(0) =A+ ei], ∀i∈L. (4)
As we fix the policy to be φACR, we suppress the policy notation in the rest of the proof. In order to show
this result, we prove a stronger version. More precisely, we fix a sample path of arrivals of agents and jobs
during [0, T ]: t= [t1, t2, · · · , tK ] where tk is the time of the kth arrival. Let K be the total number of arrivals.
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Although K is random, our analysis is on a single realization of t (whose length is K) on which K is a fixed
finite value.
Another sequence s1, s2, · · · , sK ∈ L indicates the type of arrivals with s = [s1, · · · , sK ]. Each arrival can
be either an agent or a job which is further specified by another sequence v1, v2, · · · , vK ∈ {Agent,Job} with
v= [v1, · · · , vK ].
We now formally state a stronger version of the result. For any t, s and v the following holds:
E[M(T ) |A(0) =A+ e0, t, s, v ]≥E[M(T ) |A(0) =A+ ei, t, s, v ], ∀i∈L. (5)
Here, because we are conditioning on the arrival times t, the arrival types s, and whether they are jobs or
agents v, this conditional expectation is only taken over agent reneging.
We proceed by backward induction on k ∈ {0, · · · ,K} with t0 = 0. t−k is the time epoch immediately before
tk. For any k ∈ {0, . . . ,K}, let Mk(A) denote the number of matches that can be done over [tk, T ] when there
are A agents in the system at time t−k . Conditional on the arrival sequences, its expectation over patience is
defined as Mˆk(A),E[Mk(A) | t, s, v ].
We need to show that
Mˆk(A+ e0)≥ Mˆk(A+ ei), ∀k ∈ {0, . . . ,K},∀A≥ 0,∀i∈L. (6)
We start with k=K. In this case MˆK(A+ e0)≥ MˆK(A+ ei) for any A and i∈L. To see this, we consider
the following situations based on the types of the arrivals:
(1) vK is an agent of type sK ∈L. In such case, MˆK(A) = 0 for all A≥ 0 as there is no job arrival within
[tk, T ].
(2) vK is a job of type sK = 0. In such case, for any i∈L, we have
MˆK(A+ e0) = 1{A0+1>0} ≥ 1{A0+1{i=sK}>0} = MˆK(A+ ei)
(3) vK is a job of type sK 6= 0. In such case, for any i∈L, we have
MˆK(A+ e0) = 1{AsK +A0+1>0} ≥ 1{AsK +A0+1{i=sK}>0} = MˆK(A+ ei)
Suppose that eq. (25) holds for some k+ 1 we argue that it also holds for k. Within (tk, tk+1) there are no
arrivals to the systems, only agents that renege. Let Rik(A) be the number of agents of type i that renege in
(tk, tk+1), more precisely,
Rik(A) =
Ai∑
n=1
Xi,nk , (7)
where Xi,nk are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables that equal 1 if the nth type i agent reneges in (tk, tk+1) and
0 otherwise. Rk(A) = {Rik(A)}i∈L. We have,
Xi,nk =
{
0, w.p. pk
1, w.p. 1− pk ,
where pk = e−θ(tk+1−tk). Denote Xk(A) = {Xi,nk }i∈L,n∈{1,··· ,Ai}. We use a shorthand notation Xk in the rest
of the proof as they are i.i.d. We will frequently use conditional expectations given t, s, and v that happens
during the time period within (tk, tk+1). The only randomness in such conditional expectations is the reneging
Bernoulli random variables Xk. For brevity and clarity, we write such conditional expectations as EXk [·],
dropping the t, s, v from our notation.
We now analyze based on the types of arrivals at time tk.
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(1) vk is an agent of type sk ∈L. We have,
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ e0 + esk −Rk(A+ e0 + esk))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ ei + esk −Rk(A+ ei + esk))
]
=EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ esk −Rk(A+ esk) + e0(1−Xk))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ esk −Rk(A+ esk) + ei(1−Xk))
]
,
Note that here we are re-starting the patience clocks of the agents in the system, this is possible due to the
memoryless property of exponential random variables.
Now let ∆ =A+ esk −Rk(A+ esk), by conditioning on ∆ and taking expectation over Xk we deduce:
EXk
[
Mˆk+1(∆ + e0(1−Xk)) |∆
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(∆ + ei(1−Xk)) |∆
]
=(1− pk)(Mˆk+1(∆ + e0)− Mˆk+1(∆ + ei))≥ 0, (a.s.)
where the last inequality holds by induction hypothesis. This proves the result for case (a) by noting that
for any i∈L, we have:
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=E∆
[
EXk
[
Mˆk+1(∆ + e0(1−Xk)) |∆
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(∆ + ei(1−Xk)) |∆
]]
≥ 0.
(2) vk is a job of type sk = 0. We define m0(A) as the dispatch value where m0(A) = 1 if the platform
matches this type 0 job with a type 0 agent and 0 otherwise, given the number of agents in each type A. We
then have,
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=
[
m0(A+ e0) +EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ e0−m0(A+ e0)e0−Rk(A+ e0−m0(A+ e0)e0))
]]
−
[
m0(A+ ei) +EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ ei−m0(A+ ei)e0−Rk(A+ ei−m0(A+ ei)e0))
]]
• Under the case of m0(A+ ei) = 1, it is clear that m0(A+ e0) = 1 as well. In such case, we have
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ e0− e0−Rk(A+ e0− e0))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ ei− e0−Rk(A+ ei− e0))
]
≥ 0.
This is true by using the same technique as case (1) — conditioning on Rk(A− e0) and show the conditional
expectations are non-negative almost surely. Note that A− e0 ≥ 0 as m0(A+ ei) = 1.
• Under the case of m0(A+ ei) = 0 and m0(A+ e0) = 1, we have
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=1 +EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A−Rk(A))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ ei−Rk(A+ ei))
]
≥ 0.
We prove this result using Lemma 2 at the end of proof and by coupling Xk in both expectations. Note that
the second expectation has one more type i agent to start with, so when coupling the reneging, there will be a
scenario where the second expectation reneges one more type i agent. In such case, Mˆk(A+e0)−Mˆk(A+ei) =
1≥ 0 which is trivial.
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(3) vk is a job of type sk 6= 0. Similarly, we define m0(A) as the dispatch value where m0(A) = 1 if the
platform matches this type sk job with a type 0 agent and 0 otherwise, given the number of agents in each
type A. We also define msk(A) as the dispatch value where msk(A) = 1 if the platform matches this type sk
job with a type sk agent and 0 otherwise, given the number of agents in each type A. We then have,
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=
[
m0(A+ e0) +msk(A+ e0)
+EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ e0−m0(A+ e0)e0−msk(A+ e0)esk −Rk(A+ e0−m0(A+ e0)e0−msk(A+ e0)esk))
]]
−
[
m0(A+ ei) +msk(A+ ei)
+EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ ei−m0(A+ ei)e0−msk(A+ ei)esk −Rk(A+ ei−m0(A+ ei)e0−msk(A+ ei)esk))
]]
• Under the case that m0(A+ ei) = 1 we must have m0(A+ e0) = 1. We then have,
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ e0− e0−Rk(A+ e0− e0))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ ei− e0−Rk(A+ ei− e0))
]
≥ 0,
by conditioning on Rk(A− e0) and show the conditional expectations are non-negative almost surely.
• Under the case that msk(A+ e0) = 1 we must have msk(A+ ei) = 1. We then have,
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ e0− esk −Rk(A+ e0− esk))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ ei− esk −Rk(A+ ei− esk))
]
≥ 0,
by conditioning on Rk(A− esk) and show the conditional expectations are non-negative almost surely.
• Under the case that m0(A+ e0) = 1 and msk(A+ ei) = 1. In such case, sk = i. We then have,
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ e0− e0−Rk(A+ e0− e0))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ ei− ei−Rk(A+ ei− ei))
]
= 0.
• The last case is m0(A+ e0) = 1, msk(A+ ei) =m0(A+ ei) = 0. In such case we have,
Mˆk(A+ e0)− Mˆk(A+ ei)
=1 +EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A−Rk(A))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆk+1(A+ ei−Rk(A+ ei))
]
≥ 0.
We prove this result by using Lemma 2 below and by coupling Xk in both expectations.
Lemma 2. For any k ∈ {0, · · · ,K}, we have 1 + MˆpiACRk (A)≥ Mˆpi
ACR
k (A+ ei),∀i∈L.
Proof. We prove a stronger version of this result by fixing a sample path of job and agent arrivals and
agents’ patience levels. We will run the same sample path under the ACR policy but with different initial
states, one with A and the other with A+ ei. We refer to the system that starts from A as S1 and we use S2
for the other system starting with A+ ei. We couple the reneging in both systems of the A agents, except
that there is an additional agent of type i in system S2 we denote by di (this agent is not in S1). We divide
the discussions into three cases:
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• Agent di reneges before S2 tries to match her. The sample paths of S1 and S2 are the same in terms of
matches.
• S2 never tries to match di so that she is still in the system at time T . The sample path of S1 and S2 are
the same in terms of matches.
• S2 matches agent di during [tk, T ]. There are two subcases:
(1) S2 matches di with a job whereas S1 loses that job. In that case, S1 runs out of type 0 agents and
type i agents, and di is the only type i agent in S2. In this case, after S2 matches di, both systems become
identical (both systems do not have type i and type 0 agents and the other type of agents have not change
in either system) which implies that from that time on they make the same number of matches. Since S1
makes one more match before, we achieve our result.
(2) S2 matches di with a job whereas S1 matches the job as well but with a different agent di′ of type
i′. Then at that moment, S2 will have an additional number of type i′ agent and all else are the same. Note
that both systems make the same number of matches up to that moment and from here we can iterate the
argument. As we achieve the inequality in the rest of the cases, we conclude the proof by noting that we can
only iterate this argument finite number of times. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We first prove the result for a fixed time horizon T > 0. Similar to the proof
of Lemma 1, we fix a sample path of arrivals of agents and jobs during [0, T ]: t= [t1, t2, · · · , tK ] where tk is
the time of the kth arrival. Let K be the total number of arrivals. Sequence s= [s1, s2, · · · , sK ] indicates the
arrival type and another sequence v= [v1, v2, · · · , vk] indicates whether the arrival is of agent or job.
We use a short hand notation φi(A) instead of φi(A, j) as during each step of the proof, the job type j is
often fixed and can be easily inferred from the context. We want to show the following,
E[MφACR(T ) |A(0) =A ] = sup
φ∈Φ
E[Mφ(T ) |A(0) =A ], ∀T ≥ 0,A≥ 0. (8)
To prove eq. (8), we prove that E[MφACR(T ) |A(0) =A ]≥E[Mφ(T ) |A(0) =A ] for any arbitrary candidate
policy φ ∈ Φ. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we proceed by backward induction on k ∈ {0, · · · ,K} with
t0 = 0. t−k is the time epoch immediately before tk. For any k ∈ {0, . . . ,K}, let Mˆφk (A) denote the conditional
expected number of matches under policy φ given arrival sequences t, s, v that can be done over [tk, T ] when
there are A agents in the system at time t−k . Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, the expectation is taken over
reneging only since we are conditioning on t, s, v.
We need to show that
Mˆφ
ACR
k (A)≥ Mˆφk (A), ∀φ∈Φ,∀k ∈ {0, . . . ,K},∀A≥ 0. (9)
We start with k=K. In this case Mˆφ
ACR
K (A)≥ MˆφK(A), ∀φ∈Φ,∀A≥ 0. To see this, we consider the following
situations based on the types of the arrivals:
(1) vK is an agent of type sK ∈ L. In such case, Mˆφ
ACR
K (A) = Mˆ
φ
K(A) = 0 for all A≥ 0 and φ ∈Φ as there
is no job arrival within [tk, T ].
(2) vK is a job of type sK = 0. In such case, for any φ∈Φ, we have
Mˆφ
ACR
K (A) = 1{A0>0} ≥ 1{A0>0} ·φ0(A) = MˆφK(A)
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(3) vK is a job of type sK 6= 0. In such case, for any φ∈Φ, we have
Mˆφ
ACR
K (A) = 1{AsK +A0>0} ≥ 1{AsK>0} ·φsK(A) + 1{A0>0} ·φ0(A) = MˆφK(A)
Suppose that eq. (9) holds for some k + 1 we argue that it also holds for k. Within (tk, tk+1) there are
no arrivals to the systems, only agents that renege. We use the same notation Rk(A), Xk and conditional
expectation EXk [·] in the proof of Lemma 1 to model agent reneging in (tk, tk+1).
We now analyze based on the types of arrivals at time tk.
(1) vk is an agent of type sk ∈L. In this case, for any φ∈Φ, we have,
Mˆφ
ACR
k (A)− Mˆφk (A)
=EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A+ esk −Rk(A+ esk))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆφk+1(A+ esk −Rk(A+ esk))
]
≥ 0,
by the induction hypothesis.
(2) vk is a job of type sk = 0. In this case, for any φ∈Φ, we have,
Mˆφ
ACR
k (A)− Mˆφk (A)
=1{A0>0}+EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−1{A0>0}e0−Rk(A−1{A0>0}e0))
]
−
[
1{A0>0}φ0(A) +φ0(A)EXk
[
Mˆφk+1(A−1{A0>0}e0−Rk(A−1{A0>0}e0))
]
+ (1−φ0(A))EXk
[
Mˆφk+1(A−Rk(A))
]]
≥(1−φ0(A)) ·
[
1{A0>0}+EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−1{A0>0}e0−Rk(A−1{A0>0}e0))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
]]
≥ 0
(10)
Inequality (10) is true by induction hypothesis where we replace Mˆφk+1(·) with Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(·). eq. (10) is non-
negative by applying Lemma 2 and coupling reneging Xk.
(3) vk is a job of type sk 6= 0. In this case, for any φ∈Φ we have,
Mˆφ
ACR
k (A)− Mˆφk (A)
=1{A0+Ask>0}+ 1{Ask=0}EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−1{A0>0}e0−Rk(A−1{A0>0}e0))
]
+ 1{Ask>0}EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−1{Ask>0}esk −Rk(A−1{Ask>0}esk))
]
−
[
1{A0>0}φ0(A) + 1{Ask>0}φsk(A) +φ0(A)EXk
[
Mˆφk+1(A−1{A0>0}e0−Rk(A−1{A0>0}e0))
]
+φsk(A)EXk
[
Mˆφk+1(A−1{Ask>0}esk −Rk(A−1{Ask>0}esk))
]
+ (1−φ0(A)−φsk(A))EXk
[
Mˆφk+1(A−Rk(A))
]]
≥1{A0+Ask>0}+ 1{Ask=0}EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−1{A0>0}e0−Rk(A−1{A0>0}e0))
]
+ 1{Ask>0}EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−1{Ask>0}esk −Rk(A−1{Ask>0}esk))
]
−
[
1{A0>0}φ0(A) + 1{Ask>0}φsk(A) +φ0(A)EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−1{A0>0}e0−Rk(A−1{A0>0}e0))
]
+φsk(A)EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−1{Ask>0}esk −Rk(A−1{Ask>0}esk))
]
+ (1−φ0(A)−φsk(A))EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
]]
(11)
Inequality (11) is true by induction hypothesis where we replace Mˆφk+1(·) with Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(·).
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• Under the case of Ask = 0 and A0 = 0. We can simplify eq. (11) as
Mˆφ
ACR
k (A)− Mˆφk (A)≥ φsk(A)EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
]
≥ 0
• Under the case of Ask > 0 and A0 = 0. We can simplify eq. (11) as
Mˆφ
ACR
k (A)− Mˆφk (A)≥ (1−φsk(A))
(
1 +EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A− esk −Rk(A− esk))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
])
≥ 0
This is true by applying (13) and coupling reneging Xk.
• Under the case of Ask = 0 and A0 > 0. We can simplify eq. (11) as
Mˆφ
ACR
k (A)− Mˆφk (A)
≥1−φ0(A) + (1−φ0(A))EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A− e0−Rk(A− e0))
]
− (1−φ0(A)−φsk(A))EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
]
≥1−φ0(A) + (1−φ0(A))EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A− e0−Rk(A− e0))
]
− (1−φ0(A))EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
]
=(1−φ0(A))
(
1 +EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A− e0−Rk(A− e0))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
])
≥ 0
This is true by applying (13) and coupling reneging Xk.
• Under the case of Ask > 0 and A0 > 0. We can simplify eq. (11) as
Mˆφ
ACR
k (A)− Mˆφk (A)
≥1−φsk(A)−φ0(A) + (1−φsk(A))EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A− esk −Rk(A− esk))
]
−φ0(A)EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A− e0−Rk(A− e0))
]
− (1−φ0(A)−φsk(A))EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
]
≥1−φsk(A)−φ0(A) + (1−φsk(A))EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A− esk −Rk(A− esk))
]
−φ0(A)EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A− esk −Rk(A− esk))
]
− (1−φ0(A)−φsk(A))EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
]
(12)
=(1−φ0(A)−φsk(A))
(
1 +EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A− esk −Rk(A− esk))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆφ
ACR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
])
≥ 0 (13)
Via coupling reneging Xk, inequality (12) is true by applying Lemma 1 and inequality (13) is true by applying
Lemma 2.
As we proved that,
E[MφACR(T ) |A(0) =A ]≥E[Mφ(T ) |A(0) =A ], ∀φ∈Φ, T ≥ 0,A≥ 0,
we have,
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E[MφACR(T ) |A(0) =A ]≥ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E[Mφ(T ) |A(0) =A ], ∀φ∈Φ,A≥ 0,
by noting that 1
T
E[Mφ(T ) |A(0) =A ]≤∑j∈L µj for all T > 0, φ∈Φ. Thus the above limit superiors are well
defined and finite. This completes the proof. 
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B. Proofs in Section 4
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof follows similar steps as Theorem 1 in Smith (1979) for proving
the existence of Wardrop equilibrium. Fix a policy pi, we first give an equivalent definition of σ being an
equilibrium, aside from eq. (NE).∑
i∈L,q∈Q
E[W piiq(σ)](σiq − σ˜iq)≤ 0, ∀σ˜ ∈Σ(Q) ⇐⇒ σiq > 0 ⇒ E[W piiq(σ)] ≤ E[W piiq′(σ)], ∀q′ ∈Q
We prove this equivalence:
• “⇐=” ∑
i∈L,q∈Q
E[W piiq(σ)]σiq
=
∑
i∈L,q∈Q:σiq>0
E[W piiq(σ)]σiq
=
∑
i∈L,q∈Q:σiq>0
min
k
E[W piiq(σ)]σiq
=
∑
i∈L,q∈Q:σiq>0
min
k
E[W piiq(σ)]σ˜iq
≤
∑
i∈L,q∈Q:σiq>0
E[W piiq(σ)]σ˜iq
=
∑
i∈L,q∈Q
E[W piiq(σ)]σ˜iq
• “=⇒”
For this direction, we prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists a σi∗q∗ > 0 and E[W pii∗q∗(σ)] >
E[W pii∗q(σ)],∀q ∈Q. Now consider a σ˜ which is constructed as follows:
σ˜iq =

σiq, i 6= i∗
0, i= i∗, q= q∗
σiq +
σi∗q∗
|Q| , i= i∗, q 6= q∗
It can be seen that
∑
i∈L,q∈QE[W piiq(σ)](σiq − σ˜iq)> 0, which reaches a contradiction.
This equivalent condition says that the vector E[W pi(σ)] with components E[W piiq(σ)] is normal to the
simplex Σ(Q) at σ. Let PΣ(·) be the projection operator onto Σ(Q). Define the mapping f : Σ(Q)→Σ(Q) by
f(σ) = PΣ(σ−E[W piiq(σ)]), then the equilibrium condition can be cast as the fixed point equation f(σ) = σ.
Since by assumption W pi(σ) is continuous and projection operator onto bounded convex set is continuous,
then f is a continuous function as composition of continuous functions is continuous. By Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem we deduce that an equilibrium always exists. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 3. Under the ACR policy, it is a dominant strategy for a specialized type i∈L\{0} agent to join
the corresponding queue i, i.e., σACRii = 1,∀i∈L\ {0}.
Proof. Fix i 6= 0. Under the ACR policy, type i agents can only be matched in queue i or queue 0 with
type i jobs. In any other queue their waiting time would be infinity. Since the ACR policy only attempts to
match type i jobs with agents in queue 0 when queue i becomes empty, a type i agent would wait less in
queue i than in the queue 0. This concludes the proof. 
Castro et al.: Matching Queues, Flexibility and Incentives
31
Proof of Proposition 3. Given λ > 0, µ1 > 0, and θ > 0, we will show that there exists µ0 such that
for any µ0 <µ0, we have σACR01 = 1 as the unique equilibrium.
Under the ACR policy, we make the following observations and definitions.
Observations:
• It is not necessary to differentiate between flexible and specialized agents that join queue 1 because we
only match them with type 1 jobs. Queue 1 then behaves exactly as an M/M/1 +M queue with parameters
λ1 +λ0σ01, µ1 and θ.
Definitions:
• W00(σ;µ0): steady state waiting time of type 0 agent in queue 0, where we stress the dependence on σ
and µ0. We omit the dependence on the other parameters as they will be fixed along the proof.
• W01(σ): steady state waiting time of type 0 agent in queue 1, note that this quantity is independent
from µ0, but it does depend on the σ.
• p10(σ): steady state probability that queue 1 is empty.
• T i: time between arrivals of type i ∈ {0,1} jobs to the system, note that T i is an exponential random
variable with mean 1/µi.
• T c(σ): steady state time between two consecutive arrivals of type 1 jobs to queue 1 that encounter an
empty queue 1. By Poisson thinning and PASTA, T c(σ) is exponentially distributed with mean 1/(µ1p10(σ)).
• Y c(σ): steady state excess time (or residual life) associated with the renewal process defined by T c(σ).
This random variable measures the steady state time until the next renewal. From Proposition 3.4.6 in Ross
(1995) we have
E[Y c(σ)] = E[T
c(σ)2]
2E[T c(σ)] , (14)
provided E[T c(σ)2]<∞, which we will verify later.
We show that there exists µ0 > 0 such that for any µ≤ µ0 and for any queue-joining strategy profile σ, we
have
E[W00(σ,µ0)]>E[W01(σ)]. (15)
Fix µ0 > 0 and σ. Note that when a flexible agent arrives to the system and joins queue 0, her waiting
times is bounded below by the minimum between the inter-arrival time of type 0 job (T 0), or the time until
a type 1 job encounters queue 1 empty (Y c(σ)). That is, we have that
E[W00(σ,µ0)]≥E[min{T 0, Y c(σ)}] =E
[
1− e−µ0Y c(σ)
µ0
]
,
where in the last equality we used the fact that T 0 is exponentially distributed with mean 1/µ0 and that T 0
and Y c(σ) are independent. Let f(µ0;y) = 1−e
−µ0y
µ0
, a Taylor expansion around 0 (with remainder) delivers
f(µ0;y) = y− ξ2y
2, for some ξ ∈ [0, µ0]. (16)
In turn,
E[W00(σ,µ0)]≥E [Y c(σ)]− µ02 E[Y
c(σ)2]. (17)
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As T c(σ) is exponentially distributed with mean 1/(p10(σ)µ1), we have the following second moment,
E[T c(σ)2] = 2
p10(σ)2
1
µ21
.
Hence, from eq. (14) we have that
E [Y c(σ)] = E[T
c(σ)2]
2E[T c(σ)] =
2
p10(σ)2
1
µ21
1
p10(σ)·µ1
= 1
p10(σ) ·µ1
=E[T c(σ)]≥E[W01(σ)] + 1
µ1
. (18)
The second to the last equality comes from the definition of T c(σ). The last inequality states that the steady
state waiting time of an agent in queue 1 plus the inter-arrival time of type 1 job is always less than or equal
to the cycle time of type 1 job seeing empty queue 1. This is because an agent in queue 1 can potentially be
matched to a type 1 job when there are other agents in queue 1 (before queue 1 clears).
Next, we consider the term E[Y c(σ)2]. Let G denote the cdf of Y c(σ) and F denote the cdf of T c(σ), then
from Proposition 3.4.5 in Ross (1995) we have that
G(x) = p10(σ) ·µ1
∫ x
0
(1−F (s))ds
= p10(σ) ·µ1
∫ x
0
e−p
1
0(σ)µ1sds
= 1− e−p10(σ)µ1x,
that is, Y c(σ) is exponentially distributed with parameter p10(σ)µ1, same as T c(σ). In turn,
E[Y c(σ)2] = 2
p10(σ)2µ21
≤ 2
µ21
· sup
σ
1
p10(σ)2
. (19)
Note that the supremum above is attained because p10(·) is continuous and σ is bounded. Now, use eq. (18)
and eq. (19) in eq. (17) to obtain
E[W00(σ,µ0)]≥E[W01(σ)] + 1
µ1
− µ0
µ21
· sup
σ
1
pi10(σ)2
. (20)
Note that the last two terms in the expression above are independent from σ, and therefore, we can choose µ0
small enough such that eq. (15) is satisfied. For those values of µ0, no type 0 agent would have an incentive
to switch to queue 0. Hence, the only equilibrium is such that σACR01 = 1. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Given λ > 0, µ1 > 0, and θ > 0, we will show that there exists µ0 such that for
any µ0 <µ0, we have
TP(piACR;σACR)< TP(piNCR), ∀σACR that satisfies eq. (NE).
In Proposition 3, we have proved that the only equilibrium is such that σACR01 = 1. That is, the system
becomes effectively a decoupled system with 2 queues where all agents are in queue 1. The throughput of
this system, however, is dominated by the throughput of policy NCR because the former system loses all
flexible jobs whereas the later does not. In other words, in the equilibrium σACR01 = 1, the ACR policy acts like
policy NCR but with arrival rate of µ1 instead of µ0 and µ1 and, therefore, yields a lower throughput. This
concludes the proof. 
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C. Proofs in Section 5
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall W piRCR0q (σ) and W pi
ACR
0q (σ) be the steady state waiting time of type 0 agent
in queue q under the RCR and the ACR policy, respectively, when the queue-joining strategy is σ. Since we
restrict ourselves to two types L= {0,1}, we can effectively use σ01 to represent the strategy profile σ.
Note that W piACR01 (σ01) is increasing in σ01 because under the ACR policy, larger σ01 increases the arrival
rate of agents to queue 1 but it does not change the arrival rate of jobs to this queue, and queue 1 behaves
as an M/M/1+M queue. Also, for any σ01 ∈ [0,1] we must have W piACR01 (σ01)≥W pi
RCR
01 (σ01). To see why this is
true, consider a sample path argument where we tag a type 0 agent arriving to queue 1 in two systems —
one runs under policy RCR and the other runs under the ACR policy — that encounter the same queue
length in queue 1. Let us further consider the time it takes the tagged agent to be matched. Under the ACR
policy, the tagged agent can only be matched to some job of type 1 but not type 0. In contrast, under policy
RCR, the tagged agent can be match to a job of type 0 as long as queue 0 is empty, on top of being possibly
matched to type 1 job. In turn, the tagged agent on any sample path will wait less under policy RCR than
under the ACR policy. That is, W piACR01 (σ01)≥W pi
RCR
01 (σ01) for any σ01.
Now we argue that W piACR00 (σ01) =W pi
RCR
00 (σ01) for all σ01 ∈ [0,1]. Similar to the sample path argument in the
previous paragraph, consider a tagged type 0 agent arriving to queue 0, we show that this arrival experiences
the same waiting time in systems under two policies for each sample path. Indeed, simply notice that the
allocation of jobs to agents in queue 0, when starting from the same state, is the same under both policies.
The only difference merges when queue 0 is empty, but at that moment the tagged agent has already left
the system.
σ01
waiting time
W pi
ACR
01 (σ01)
W pi
RCR
01 (σ01)
W pi
RCR
01 (0)
W pi
ACR
01 (0)
W pi
RCR
00 (σ01) =W pi
ACR
00 (σ01)
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Figure 9 Illustration for the Proof of Lemma 4
Figure 9 above illustrates these waiting times which reflect the relationship we just proved above.W piRCR00 (σ01)
collapses with W piACR00 (σ01) for all σ01 (blue curve), while W pi
ACR
00 (σ01)≥W pi
RCR
00 (σ01) for all σ01 (black solid and
dashed curves). To conclude the proof, we consider three cases below based on the relative value of W piRCR00 (σ01)
(and W piACR00 (σ01)), illustrated by the three different blue curves in Figure 9.
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Case 1. W piACR00 (σ01) =W pi
RCR
00 (σ01)>W pi
ACR
01 (σ01), ∀σ01:
In such case, since W piACR00 (σ01)≥W pi
RCR
00 (σ01), ∀σ01, we can deduce that the only equilibriums under the ACR
and the RCR policies are σACR01 = σRCR01 = 1, respectively.
Case 2. W piACR00 (0) =W pi
RCR
00 (0)>W pi
ACR
01 (0), there exists σB∗01 ∈ [0,1] such that W pi
ACR
00 (σ∗01) =W pi
ACR
01 (σ∗01):
In such case, σACR01 = σ∗01, while clearly σRCR01 ≥ σ∗01 as for all σ01 < σ∗01 we have W pi
RCR
00 (σ01) ≤W pi
ACR
01 (σ01) <
W pi
RCR
00 (σ01).
Case 3. W piACR00 (0) =W pi
RCR
00 (0)≤W pi
ACR
01 (0):
In such case, σACR01 = 0 is clearly one equilibrium under the ACR policy, thus we have σRCR01 = 0≥ σACR for some
equilibriums under two policies. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2 We define two sets of state representations for the RCR policy and the NCR
policy respectively.
• NCR policy: A= (Ai)i∈L, number of agents of each type as all agents join the same queue.
• RCR policy: Q= ({Q0,i}i∈L,{Qi}i∈L\{0}) where Q0,i is the number of type 0 agents in queue i and Qi
is the number of type i 6= 0 agents in queue i. Note that this definition follows the result of Lemma 3 under
RCR which states that specialized agents do not join queues other than his own type.
We first prove the result for a fixed time horizon T > 0. We want to prove the following inequality holds
for all T ≥ 0, σ ∈Σ(QRCR):
E[MpiRCR(T ;σ) |Q(0) =Q]≥E[MpiNCR(T ) |A(0) =A], ∀Q,A :A0 =
∑
i∈L
Q0,i,Ai =Qi,∀i∈L\ {0}.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, We prove a stronger (sample path) version of the
result. we fix a sample path of arrivals of agents and jobs during [0, T ]: t= [t1, t2, · · · , tK ] where tk is the time
of the kth arrival. Let K be the total number of arrivals. sequence s= [s1, s2, · · · , sK ] indicates the arrival
types. And another sequence v= [v1, v2, · · · , vK ] indicates whether the arrival is of agent or job. Furthermore,
for each sk which is a type 0 agent arrival, qk ∈QRCR indicates which queue the flexible agent chooses to join.
Let q be that vector of queue joining decisions. Note that this sample path is designed for RCR, however, it
can be used for NCR as well via consolidating the same type of agents in different queues. The comparison
of the two policies is still valid on that sample path.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we proceed by backward induction on k ∈ {0, · · · ,K}
with t0 = 0. t−k is the time epoch immediately before tk. For any k ∈ {0, . . . ,K}, let Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q) and Mˆpi
NCR
k (A)
denote the expected number of matches under policy RCR and NCR that can be done over [tk, T ] when there
are Q and A agents in the system at time t−k , respectively. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, the expectation
is taken over reneging only since we are conditioning on t, s, v.
We need to show that ∀Q,A such that A0 =
∑
i∈LQ0,i and Ai =Qi,∀i∈L\ {0},
Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q)≥ Mˆpi
NCR
k (A), ∀k ∈ {0, . . . ,K},∀A≥ 0. (21)
We start with k=K. We consider the following situations based on the types of the arrivals:
(1) vK is an agent of type sK ∈ L. In such case, MˆpiRCRK (Q) = Mˆpi
NCR
K (A) = 0 for all A≥ 0 as there is no job
arrival within [tk, T ].
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(2) vK is a job of type sK = 0. In such case, we have
Mˆpi
RCR
K (Q) = 1{∑
i∈LQ0,i>0}
= 1{A0>0} = Mˆpi
NCR
K (A)
(3) vK is a job of type sK 6= 0. In such case, we have
Mˆpi
RCR
K (Q) = 1{∑
i∈LQ0,i+QsK>0}
= 1{A0+AsK>0} = Mˆ
piNCR
K (A)
Suppose that eq. (21) holds for some k+ 1 we argue that it also holds for k. Within (tk, tk+1) there are
no arrivals to the systems, only agents that renege. We use the same notation Rk(A), Xk and conditional
expectation EXk [·] in the proof of Lemma 1 to model agent reneging in (tk, tk+1).
We now analyze based on the types of arrivals at time tk.
(1) vk is an agent of type sk = 0. In this case, we have,
Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q)− Mˆpi
NCR
k (A)
=EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q+ e0,qk −Rk(Q+ e0,qk))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A+ e0−Rk(A+ e0))
]
≥ 0,
by the induction hypothesis and coupling reneging Xk in both expectations.
(2) vk is an agent of type sk 6= 0. In this case, we have,
Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q)− Mˆpi
NCR
k (A)
=EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q+ ei−Rk(Q+ ei))
]
−EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A+ ei−Rk(A+ ei))
]
≥ 0,
by the induction hypothesis and coupling reneging Xk in both expectations.
(3) vk is a job of type sk = 0. In this case, we have,
Mˆpi
NCR
k (A) = 1{A0>0}+EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A−1{A0>0}e0−Rk(A−1{A0>0}e0))
]
• Under the case of A0 > 0, we have the following for MˆpiRCRk (Q),
Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q) = 1 +EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A− e0−Rk(A− e0))
]
.
A0 > 0 implies A0 > 0, we thus have Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q)≥ Mˆpi
NCR
k (A) by the induction hypothesis.
• Under the case that A0 = 0, suppose q is the highest priority queue according to ρRCR0 where Q0,q > 0.
We have,
Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q) = 1 +EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A− e0,q −Rk(A− e0,q))
]
.
This is because Q0,q > 0 implies A0 > 0 and A0 − 1 =
∑
i∈L\{q}Q0,i +Q0,q − 1, Ai =Qi,∀i ∈ L \ {0}. By the
induction hypothesis we have the result.
• Finally, under the case that Q0,i = 0,∀i∈L, we have A0 = 0. The result is true by induction hypothesis.
(4) vk is a job of type sk 6= 0. In this case, we have,
Mˆpi
NCR
k (A)
=1{A0+Ask>0}+
A0
A0 +Ask
1{A0>0}EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A−1{A0>0}e0−Rk(A−1{A0>0}e0))
]
+ Ask
A0 +Ask
1{Ask>0}EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A−1{Ask>0}esk −Rk(A−1{Ask>0}esk))
]
+ 1{A0+Ask=0}EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
]
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• Under the case of Q0,sk +Qsk > 0, we have the following for Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q),
Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q)
=1 + Q0,sk
Q0,sk +Qsk
EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q−1{Q0,sk>0}e0,sk −Rk(Q−1{Q0,sk>0}e0,sk))
]
+ Qsk
Q0,sk +Qsk
EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q−1{Qsk>0}esk −Rk(Q−1{Qsk>0}esk))
]
≥1 + A0
A0 +Ask
EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q−1{Q0,sk>0}e0,sk −Rk(Q−1{Q0,sk>0}e0,sk))
]
+ Ask
A0 +Ask
EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q−1{Qsk>0}esk −Rk(Q−1{Qsk>0}esk))
]
(22)
≥MˆpiNCRk (A) (23)
Inequality (22) is true as Qsk
Q0,sk+Qsk
≤ Ask
Ask+A0
and Q0,sk
Q0,sk+Qsk
≥ A0
Ask+A0
as Q0,sk ≤A0 and Qsk =Ask , along
with the fact that
EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q−1{Qsk>0}esk −Rk(Q−1{Qsk>0}esk))
]
≥EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q−1{Q0,sk>0}e0,sk −Rk(Q−1{Q0,sk>0}e0,sk))
]
(24)
Inequality (24) is in parallel with Lemma 1 which we formally state in Lemma 4 below. Inequality (23) is
true by the induction hypothesis.
• Under the case of Q0,sk + Qsk = 0, suppose q is the highest priority queue according to ρRCRsk where
Q0,q > 0. We have the following for Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q),
Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q)
=1 +EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q− e0,q −Rk(Q− e0,q))
]
≥1 +EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A− e0−Rk(A− e0))
]
=MˆpiNCRk (A),
by the induction hypothesis.
• Under the case of Qsk =Q0,i = 0,∀i∈L, we have,
Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q) =EXk
[
Mˆpi
RCR
k+1(Q−Rk(Q))
]
≥EXk
[
Mˆpi
NCR
k+1(A−Rk(A))
]
= MˆpiNCRk (A),
by the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 4 (Value of a Flexible Agent under policy RCR). For any time horizon T ≥ 0, fixing a
sequence of arrivals t, s, v within the interval [0, T ], given any Q,
E[MpiRCR(T ) |Q(0) =Q+ e0,i]≥E[MpiRCR(T ) |Q(0) =Q+ ei], ∀i∈L\ {0}, (25)
where the expectation is taken over reneging only.
Proof Sketch. The steps of the proof follow closely with that of the proof for Lemma 1, except the state
space is changed from A to Q. To avoid repetitive presentation, we only present a brief proof sketch here
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and omit the details. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, the proof is based on an inductive argument over the
arrival time t1, · · · , tK , and divide the comparison based on different types of arrivals. If time tk corresponds
to an agent arrival, the comparison directly follows from the induction hypothesis. In the case of a job arrival,
there are two cases:
• If both systems (one starts with Q+ e0,i and the other starts with Q+ ei) can match the job. There are
three subcases:
(1) If the job is matched with agents outside queue i, then the comparison follows directly from the
induction hypothesis.
(2) If the job is matched with a type i agent (or a type 0 agent) in queue i for both systems, then the
comparison follows directly from the induction hypothesis.
(3) If the job is matched with a type 0 agent in queue i in the system starting with Q+e0,i and a type i
agent in queue i in the system starting with Q+ ei, then the two systems become identical after the match.
The comparison follows directly.
• If the system starting with Q + e0,i can fulfill the job whereas and the system starting with Q + ei
cannot. The comparison requires the following result which is very similar to Lemma 2.
Lemma 5. For any k ∈ {0, · · · ,K}, given any Q, we have 1 + MˆpiRCRk (Q)≥ Mˆpi
RCR
k (Q+ ei),∀i∈L.
The result can be proved by a similar sample path argument as the proof for Lemma 2. This completes the
proof of Theorem 2. 
